AirBorne: Wormable Zero-Click Exploitation of AirPlay Protocol Threatens CarPlay Ecosystems

AirBorne: Wormable Zero-Click Exploitation of AirPlay Protocol Threatens CarPlay Ecosystems

Table of Contents

Abstract

Oligo Security has identified 23 vulnerabilities—17 assigned CVEs—within Apple’s AirPlay protocol and AirPlay SDK, impacting native Apple devices and third-party implementations, including CarPlay-enabled automotive infotainment systems. Two critical vulnerabilities, CVE-2025-24132 (stack-based buffer overflow) and CVE-2025-24252 (use-after-free), permit wormable zero-click remote code execution (RCE) under certain configurations.

Reference: Full vulnerability details are available in Oligo Security’s AirBorne report.

Key Risks to Automotive Systems

The identified vulnerabilities facilitate compromise of CarPlay environments through network-adjacent or local physical vectors:

  • Zero-Click & One-Click RCE
  • Lateral Propagation
    • Wormable RCE enables autonomous spread between AirPlay-enabled devices across in-vehicle and external networks.
  • Attack Surfaces
    • Wi-Fi: Exploitable where CarPlay hotspots use default or predictable credentials.
    • Bluetooth: Credential leakage over IAP2 protocol allows proximity-based compromise.
    • USB: Wired CarPlay interfaces are susceptible via direct connection.

Potential Automotive Impacts

  • Injection of distracting media or visuals into the driver’s interface
  • Geolocation tracking of vehicles via compromised infotainment units
  • Passive audio surveillance via embedded microphones
  • Pivoting from infotainment to other in-vehicle networks or telematics systems

Technical Basis

AirBorne exploits arise from insecure handling of property list (plist) arguments in AirPlay control commands. Vulnerability classes include:

Such weaknesses enable both code execution and broader post-exploitation objectives, including credential theft and man-in-the-middle (MITM) positioning.

  1. Immediate software updates to CarPlay devices and connected Apple endpoints
  2. Restrict AirPlay receiver settings to “Current User”
  3. Disable AirPlay receiver if functionality is non-essential
  4. Apply network segmentation and firewall rules to block port 7000 except for trusted hosts

Conclusion

AirBorne exemplifies how consumer-facing connectivity protocols can introduce critical vulnerabilities into automotive infotainment environments. The presence of wormable zero-click RCE pathways underscores the necessity of secure-by-design protocol implementation, robust input validation, and proactive update policies across the automotive software supply chain.